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ABSTRACT 
The principle of gender equality forms a part of the EU’s social policy and serves equally 
men and women. So far, fourteen directives concerning gender equality have been adopted 
in the EU, with the New Equal Treatment Directive as the latest one. The EU has developed 
different models to promote gender equality: equal treatment, positive action and most 
recently gender mainstreaming. The equal treatment model is primarily concerned with 
formal equality and it unfortunately prevails in the ECJ’s rulings. Indeed, this paper argues 
that so far, the ECJ has not managed to develop a firm and consistent case law on gender 
equality, nor to stretch it coherently to positive action and gender mainstreaming. It seems 
that in spite of some progress in promoting the position of women, the ECJ’s case law has 
recently taken a step backwards with its conservative judgments in e.g. the Cadman case. 
Overall, this paper aims at summing up and evaluating the most important cases of the ECJ 
on gender equality.  
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1 INTRODUCTION TO GENDER EQUALITY 
The notion of gender equality dates back to the 19th century feminist movements. Feminism 
as a collection of social theories, political movements and moral philosophies principally 
was aimed at the liberation of women from their subordination to men.1 The belief in the 
equality of genders is often expressed as "gender equity", "gender equality", or “gender 
egalitarianism”.2 
Gender equality is a fundamental principle of the modern democracy and, most 
importantly, a human right. “Equality” extends beyond the limited concept of non-
discrimination. It is not only concerned with the mere denial of equality, but also includes 
the active promotion of equal rights.3 Moreover, gender equality is not exclusively a tool 
for the emancipation of women. Because the position of women has historically been 
inferior to that of men, equality has in the contemporary societies aimed at improving the 
situation of women. The concept of gender equality does, however, include also the 
promotion of men’s rights.  
Equality between men and women is very important. It is necessary for global stability, 
growth and social cohesion. The economic growth and competitiveness of a country 
depends, to a notable extent, on the proper implementation of gender equality.4 In an 
ageing society, the significance of women as a great potential labour force increases 
further. For all these reasons, one of the main goals of the European Union (EU) has always 
been the non-discrimination of women, in particular in the field of employment.  
The idea of gender equality has greatly evolved since the establishment of the European 
Community. Achieving equality between women and men in various fields such as the 
economy, decision-making as well as social, cultural and civil life has become one of the 
key tasks of the EU.5 Today, non-discrimination forms a part of EU’s wider strategy for 
economic growth, formulated in 2000 in Lisbon6 and revamped in the 2005 Lisbon Strategy 
for growth and jobs. Unfortunately, in spite of the efforts at the European and national 
levels, inequalities still persist, both at home and at work. 7 
Gender equality policy has - or at least should have - an impact on various other polices. 
Equality in the field of employment is of the great importance, since it is linked to the EU’s 
internal market project. The main goal of this paper is to analyze the concept of gender 
equality in the European Union’s labour market from a legal perspective by evaluating the 
                                                
1 Kravetz and Marecek 2002, 459. 
2 Fitzpatrick 2006, 379-80. 
It must be also noted that in sociology, gender is differentiated from sex. Although these two terms 
are often used interchangeably, sex refers to the biological distinction between male, female or 
hermaphrodite, whereas gender is usually used for culturally imposed behavioral and temperamental 
traits that are socially attributable to the sexes (Lenz 2005, 37).  
3 McCrudden 2003, 2. 
4 European Commission 08.2005, 9. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Lisbon European Council of March 2000. During this summit, the European Council invited the 
Commission and the Member States to further all aspects of equal opportunities in employment 
policies, including reducing occupational segregation and helping to reconcile working and family life 
(European Parliament 2000) 
7 Communication 2005, 24, on Working together for growth and jobs. 
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most important case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The protection of women 
in EU level labour legislation, i.e. in the New Equal Treatment Directive8 and Parental 
Leave Directive9 seems to be satisfactory, apart from some minor shortcomings. The main 
focus of this paper is therefore on the analysis of gender equality protection in the 
judgments of the ECJ. The social or behavioural sides of the problem, albeit important, are 
thus not going to be described or evaluated in this work. 
The main purpose of this paper is to identify from a legal perspective issues in ECJ’s case-
law where changes are necessary, and to suggest solutions to the identified problems. The 
claim made is that the inconsistent and sometimes conservative decisions of the ECJ have 
prevented gender equality from developing to its fullest. Although the ECJ has shaped and 
furthered gender equality within the Union, the Court’s case law does not reflect the needs 
of our constantly transforming society. The Court should take a more proactive stance, and 
better use and further the possibilities that stem from the new European legislation.  
This paper is divided into three parts. First, a general part (Chapter 2) describes and 
analyzes briefly the three main approaches on gender equality issues in the EU, namely 1) 
equal treatment, 2) positive action and the recently introduced 3) gender mainstreaming. 
The paper explains the main definitions and concepts, such as direct and indirect 
discrimination and formal and substantial understanding of equality. It does so on the basis 
of the relevant ECJ case law. Subsequently, the main part (Chapter 3) describes recent 
developments in the case-law regarding gender equality in the employment field, i.e. equal 
access to employment, equal pay, promotions and dismissals. The paper examines in depth 
the European legal framework in these fields, and evaluates the ECJ’s contribution to 
them. Each of the analyzed cases are described in more detail in the footnotes of this 
paper when they are referred to for the first time in the text. Finally, the paper critically 
evaluates the Court’s current approach in gender related issues. It looks into the future, 
into the way forward for the ECJ in the EU gender equality policy (Chapter 4).  
                                                
8 Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation. 
9 Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and 
heath at work of pregnant workers and workers who hale recently given birth or are breastfeeding. 
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2 FROM EQUAL TREATMENT TO GENDER MAINSTREAMING 
In the course of the years, the EU has adopted three main approaches for improving the 
situation of women in the society. To understand the recent developments, both in 
legislation and in the case law, it is essential to examine briefly these approaches, as well 
as the definitions and tools implemented to operate them. 
There are two basic notions of equality - formal and substantive, which serve as a basis for 
understanding the three main approaches towards gender equality, as well as the related 
concepts. 
Formal equality, following the Aristotelian model, is to be understood as “treating the like 
as like”. Its main disadvantage is that it presumes that women and men are alike, which is 
not true in the pregnancy cases for instance. Another significant shortcoming of this model 
in the context of gender discrimination is that it works only when women are equal in all 
aspects to men. In other words, the point of reference - the norm for equality - usually is 
man. For instance, a formal equality model would favour the notion of “worker” based on 
the male norm. This means a person, who with no other “outside” obligations is committed 
permanently to an employer. The workers who do not fulfil these criteria are “atypical 
workers”. As follows, only typical workers of both genders can be treated equally. Yet 
women, more often than men, are actually atypical workers. 
On the other hand, substantive equality admits male dominance and, to counterbalance it, 
allows for means of a special, active protection of women. Most importantly, substantive 
equality acknowledges the differences between the genders and accords women different 
treatment where appropriate. It ensures equality as sameness of treatment. This system 
also has some disadvantages. The taking into account of the differences may lead to the 
creation of prejudices towards genders. The difference between the formal and 
substantive models has significance for an analysis of the case law, in particular in the 
“indirect discrimination” cases, and for positive action measures. Regrettably, even if it 
seems that the ECJ has recognized also the substantive equality model, it has not been 
consistent in its approach nor in its reactions on the competing models of equality.10  
As far as a substantive model of gender equality and positive actions are concerned, it is 
important to notice that the right to non-discrimination can also be attributed to collective 
groups. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women11 
acknowledged that tackling the special needs or situations of an entire group (women) may 
be a precondition to the realization of the “universal” human rights of the people who 
constitute that group.12 However, the rights attributable to groups of people tend to be 
individualised.13 This is dangerous, since it is the individual and not the collective rights 
that tend to become marginalised. Moreover, personal rights are usually protected by 
prohibitions rather than by a positive definition of interests and values.14 At the EU level, 
                                                
10 Hervey and Shaw 1998, 49. 
11 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979. 
12 Knop 2004, 49. 
13 In other words, the point of reference to the gender equality is a single human being (a man or a 
woman) instead of a group of women or men. 
14 Knop 2004, 38. 
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the ECJ cases often refer to individual equality.15 This approach will limit the scope of 
possible positive actions in Member States.16 
2.1 Equal Treatment  
The European Economic Community (EEC) has been principally concerned with the creation 
of a common market by removing barriers on the mobility of goods and labour, capital and 
services. Gender equality issues did not find much space in the initial framework of EEC. 
Nevertheless, the principle of equal pay for equal work was included in the social policy 
section in Art. 119 of the Treaty of Rome.17 This principle is based on the equal treatment 
approach and later on, starting from 1975, a series of directives have been adopted to 
clarify and broaden the principle in the EEC law.18 The old directives as well as the new 
legislation are predominately based on “non-discrimination”, i.e. the equal treatment 
model for combating inequalities.19  
Discrimination exists when two parties that are in the same position are treated 
differently, or when the same treatment is applied to parties that are in different 
situations.20 According to the rulings of the ECJ in Defrenne21 and Bilka22 cases, anti-
discriminatory measures include the prohibition of both direct and indirect discrimination. 
They consist of two elements: harm and causation due to detrimental treatment on the 
basis of sex.23 The equal treatment approach, which focuses primarily on the labour 
market, has been strongly criticized for overlooking inequality in other social spheres of 
life. Moreover, the case law has proved that while successful in altering behaviour and 
preventing overt forms of discrimination, this approach fails to provide fair protection in 
cases of indirect discrimination. The equal treatment approach tends to maintain the 
existing practices of “oppressive power relations”. As such, it promotes the view that 
                                                
15 See ECJ, Neath, Case C-152/91 and ECJ, Kalanke, Case 450/93. 
16 Caruso 2002, 1-5. 
17 France argued that it was necessary to include the principle of equal pay for women and men in 
order to avoid distortions in competitiveness between Member States (Ostner 2000, 25). 
18 Directive 75/117/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
application of the principle of equal pay for men and women; Directive 76/207/EEC on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion and working conditions; Directive 79/7/EEC on the 
progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of 
social security schemes; Directive 86/378/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes. 
19 O’Cinneide 2006, 352. 
20 Mathijsen 2004, 192. 
21 ECJ, G. Defrenne v. Belgian State, Case 80/70. The Belgian state airline Sabena’s employment 
contract of air hostess Gabriele Defrenne required her to retire at the age of 40, while males 
employed on the same duties could continue working up to the age of 55. She pleaded that she was 
protected by (ex.) Art. 119 of the Treaty of Rome, which guarantees the principle that women and 
men shall receive equal pay for equal work. The ECJ established the direct effect of the Art. 119, and 
that Ms. Defrenne suffered as a female worker discrimination in terms of pay as compared with her 
male colleagues in the same work of a “cabin steward”. 
22 ECJ, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH, Case C-170/84. This case concerned a situation where a department 
store – Bilka GmbH - refused to pay pensions to part-time employees. Ms Weber challenged the 
practice arguing that the occupational pension scheme was contrary to the principle of equal pay (ex. 
Art. 119 TEC). She asserted that the requirement of a minimum period of full-time employment for 
the payment of an occupational pension was disadvantageous to female workers, who more often 
than their male colleagues work in part-time jobs so as to be able to fulfil family duties. 
23 Ellis 1998, 393. 
Agata Brzezińska   9 
 
   
 
“equal treatment” law is merely concerned with the incorrect behaviour of some intolerant 
individuals, rather than with achieving social transformations of a larger scope.24  
2.1.1  Direct Discrimination 
Direct discrimination occurs 
“… where one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than 
another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation”25. 
Direct discrimination occurs, in other words, when two conditions are satisfied: the cause 
of inequality is sex (causa), and the treatment received by a person is less favourable than 
that received by a comparably situated member of the opposite sex (harm).26  
2.1.2 Indirect Discrimination 
Bilka case27 was the first case in which the Court found indirect discrimination on the 
grounds of gender. The Court stated that the policy to grant only full-time workers an 
occupational pension is contrary to Art. 119 of the Treaty of Rome. A much lower 
proportion of women than of men work full-time and the measure cannot be explained by 
factors that would exclude discrimination on the grounds of sex. According to the Court, 
only objectively justified economic grounds fall within the scope of the factors that could 
be used to justify discrimination. 
Currently, the definition of indirect discrimination may be found in Art. 2.2b of the New 
Equal Treatment Directive. The article states that indirect discrimination occurs in a 
situation 
“…where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put 
persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of 
the other sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary.” 
The ECJ has established several tests in order to find such objectively justifiable provisions, 
criteria or practices. According to the ruling in Bilka,28 the criteria of an objective 
justification to the disadvantageous practices of an individual employer are satisfied where 
the measures taken by the employer correspond to a real need on the part of the 
undertaking, are appropriate with a view to achieving the objective in question and are 
necessary to that end. The means chosen for achieving that policy must not aim at the 
discrimination of women. 
Seymour-Smith29 test is valid, not in cases of individual discriminatory practices by 
employers as was the case in Bilka, but rather for statutory employment provisions of 
                                                
24 Directive 2002/73/EC amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women (New Equal Treatment Directive) Art. 2.2a. See also 
O’Cinneide 2006, 352. 
25 Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation. 
26 Ellis 1994, 395. 
27 ECJ, Bilka Kaufhaus GmbH v. Vewebr von Hartz, Case C-170/84. 
28 Ibid. 
29 ECJ, Seymour-Smith, Case C-167/97. The case concerned Ms Seymour-Smith, who started to work 
as a secretary but was dismissed unfairly by her employer. She claimed for compensation on the basis 
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Member States. The Seymor-Smith test is more relaxed than that of Bilka.  It allows for a 
greater leeway for countries to choose and adopt rules that, although disadvantageous to 
women, fulfil the legitimate aims of i.e. social policy. In other words, the test is already 
satisfied when the unfavourable legislative provisions reflect a necessary aim of the social 
policy and are suitable and necessary for achieving that aim. However, social policy is a 
matter for the Member States. The Member States thus retain a broad margin of discretion 
as long as their provisions do not have the effect of frustrating the implementation of the 
fundamental principle of Community law: equal pay for men and women.30 
Nonetheless, the Court does not always apply the Bilka test consistently with respect to 
objective justifications. As the following chapter will indicate, in several cases some of the 
measures taken by the employer arguably did not have to be justified; thus, the strict Bilka 
test was avoided. 
2.2 Positive Action  
The anti-discrimination approach has been criticised globally for a long time already. The 
public opinion has started to advocate the substantive equality model on gender issues. In 
the early 1970s, EC Member States widely recognised the need for a more comprehensive 
model on gender equality than the simple non-discrimination approach. They stressed the 
need for “positive” intervention, also in the fields beyond the labour market.31 As a result, 
the Equal Treatment Directive32 in Art. 2.4 included the first provision in EU legislation in 
the field of gender-based positive action measures. 
According to Teresa Rees, equal treatment “implies that no individual should have fewer 
human rights or opportunities than any other”,33 whereas active promotion (in other words 
positive action) “involves the adoption of specific actions on behalf of women, in order to 
overcome their unequal starting positions in a patriarchal society”. Positive action in the 
extreme form may take the shape of positive discrimination, which seeks to increase the 
participation of women by using affirmative-action preferences or quotas.34 
The gradual movement from a simple equal treatment to a positive action approach has 
been visible, apart from the “soft” policy instruments of the Commission, in the judgments 
of the ECJ in cases such as Marschall.35 In Marschall, the ECJ stated that: 
 “… even where male and female candidates are equally qualified, male 
candidates tend to be promoted in preference to female candidates 
                                                
of unfair dismissal. The claim was refused because she did not meet the criterion of two years’ 
employment, required by a national provision. The provision affected more women than men.  
30 Ellis 2000, 1409. 
31 Mazey 2001, 25. “Positive action programmes” created exclusively to protect women 
complemented the Directives from the 1970s. These programmes sought to promote equality beyond 
the workplace by highlighting the image of women portrayed in media, encouraging equal division of 
house duties, and advocating greater participation of women in politics. 
32 Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards Access to employment, vocational training and promotion and working conditions.   
33 Rees 2000, 433. 
34 Ibid. 
35 ECJ, Marschall, Case C-409/95. Mr Marschall worked as a tenured teacher and applied for a 
promotion. However, a female candidate was chosen for the position. He challenged the provision 
that the female candidate must necessarily be appointed to the position, when both candidates are 
equally qualified, and if at the time when the post was advertised there are fewer women than men 
employed on these posts, unless reasons specific to an individual [male] candidate tilted the balance 
in his favor.  
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particularly because of prejudices and stereotypes concerning the role and 
capacities of women in working life, and the fear, for example, that women 
will interrupt their careers more frequently, that, owing to household and 
family duties, they will be less flexible in their working hours, or that they 
will be absent from work more frequently because of pregnancy, childbirth 
and breastfeeding. For these reasons, the mere fact that a male candidate 
and a female candidate are equally qualified does not mean that they have 
the same chance”.  
The ECJ thus confirmed in Marschall the right for the Member States to take positive action 
measures. The principle has been affirmed by the Amsterdam Treaty:36 the Member States’ 
right to adopt positive action measures is enshrined in Arts 3.2 and 141.4 TEC. Currently, 
also the New Equal Treatment Directive37 allows for positive actions by Member States. It 
contains the following provision: 
“Member States may maintain or adopt measures within the meaning of 
Article 141(4) of the Treaty with a view to ensuring full equality in practice 
between men and women in working life”. 
In contrast to the equal treatment approach, in the positive action model “the emphasis 
shifts from equality of access to creating conditions more likely to result in equality of 
outcome”,38 according to Rees. As was indicated above, positive action includes any form 
of action, which is designed to promote and benefit a disadvantaged group. This covers a 
vast range of policies and initiatives, which in the most extreme form could transform into 
positive discrimination or preferential treatment that is also allowed in some 
circumstances in the USA in the framework of so-called affirmative actions. In contrast to 
positive actions, affirmative actions encompass a wider range of measures, and also in 
some cases allow for an infringement of the principle of equality. These measures are more 
decisive and result-oriented than those of positive action. They for these reasons create 
conditions more favourable to the disadvantaged groups.39  
In the EU so far, there has been room for positive actions in their constrained meaning, 
only. The actions “aim at levelling the field for all players” and favour “traditionally 
discriminated categories of individuals by allowing them to compete on an equal footing, 
but [do] not promise them victory”.40  
The positive action approach consists of a number of techniques, such as special training 
and educational opportunities. These are not invasive techniques and are closer to the goal 
of substantive equality: the unequal situation will be corrected, yet without placing 
individuals outside of the protected groups in a worse situation.41   
However, there are few problems in the application of the positive action approach. The 
first problem is that the use of its mechanisms is only possible if the legal framework allows 
for it. As regards national and EC law, it indeed seems that the still predominant equal 
                                                
36 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997. 
37 Directive 2002/73/EC amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women (New Equal Treatment Directive) Art. 3. 
38 Rees 2000, 433. 
39 Ibid.  
40 See ECJ, Abrahamsson et al., Case C-407/98, and Lenaerts 2005, 131. 
41 Caruso 2002, 8. 
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treatment approach has constrained the positive action model from being widely applied.42 
The second problem is that the level and scope of actions taken in various Member States is 
uneven. In other words, the scope and application of one of EU’s main principles vary 
throughout the Member States. Third, positive actions take various shapes of “soft” as well 
as “hard” measures. This makes the approach unclear. The lack of a firm stance in allowing 
for positive actions is also recognisable in the judgments of the ECJ as will be described in 
chapter 3.2 below.  
2.3 Gender Mainstreaming  
In the EU, gender equality includes also gender mainstreaming.43 This approach was 
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. It is a very important technical tool in helping 
to develop and transfer the idea of gender equality to the fields beyond labour market. 
However, because the ECJ not so far taken a stance on gender mainstreaming, this paper 
includes only a brief explanation of this approach.  
Indeed, the status of gender mainstreaming in the EU is not clear. Some consider it as one 
of the tools of the positive action approach, while others recognize it as a third, distinct 
approach.44 It is the most far-reaching approach in the equality strategy of the EU.45 In the 
broad sense, the gender mainstreaming approach is a holistic and long-term strategy for 
achieving gender equality by “engendering” the policy-making process.46 Instead of 
creating a separate policy for gender equality, the gender perspective is introduced from 
the beginning horizontally into all other policies, programmes and procedures.47  
Generally speaking, the relationship between mainstreaming and other legal and 
constitutional principles, such as equal treatment, is unclear. Gender mainstreaming 
measures are per se “softer” and more general than the “hard” provisions of anti-
discrimination. Some fear that in the long term, this approach is going to water down the 
already relatively weak concepts in present equality law.48 On the other hand, because 
gender mainstreaming identifies problems on gender equality in various policies, it can 
then be followed by more decisive measures, measures that will address the negative 
effects of such policies. 
 
                                                
42 O’Cinneide 2006, 355. 
43 Defined by the Communication (96) 67, final on Incorporating equal opportunities for women and 
men into all Community policies and activities: “… the systematic integration of the respective 
situations, priorities and needs of women in all policies and with a view to promoting equality 
between women and men and mobilising all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose 
of achieving equality by actively and openly taking into account, at the planning stage, their effects 
on the respective situation of women and men in implementation, monitoring and evaluation”. 
44 See Schmidt 2005, 34. 
45“…take gender equality issues into the mainstream of society, the mainstream consisting of the 
directions organizations and ideas which make decisions about the policy and the resources regarding 
general or specific policies” (Council of Europe 1998). 
46 Mazey 2001, 9. 
47 Elson 2003, 1. 
48 Shaw 2001, 3-5. 
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3 GENDER EQUALITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET 
Employment is a field of paramount importance to gender equality. It was indeed the first 
target of gender equality law in European legislation. Currently in the EU, there are many 
directives, ECJ’s judgments and “soft law” measures that concern gender issues in the 
labour market. The covered issues include, for example, equal pay, access to employment, 
equal treatment, parental leave and working conditions.  
In 2006, the New Equal Treatment Directive, adopted by the European Parliament and the 
Council, simplified and updated existing Community law on the equal treatment of women 
and men at work. This Directive brought together, in a single text, “the main provisions 
existing in [the field of gender equality] as well as certain developments arising out of the 
case law of the Court of Justice”.49 The purpose of this directive is to simplify the abundant 
legislation on the equal treatment of men and women, and to facilitate a better regulation 
of the matter. It joins in a single, coherent instrument the Equal Pay, the Equal Treatment, 
the Occupational Security and the Burden of Proof Directives.  
The New Equal Treatment Directive plays an important role in the development of gender 
equality in access to employment, self-employment or occupation, including the selection 
criteria and recruitment conditions. The directive applies to all levels of employment, 
including vocational training, promotions, dismissals and working conditions. Moreover, it 
prohibits discrimination as regards membership and involvement in workers’ or employers’ 
organizations.50 It covers all types of employment contracts, including those on atypical 
work, which is very important for women. It does, however, exclude self-employed 
persons.51  
Employment has a big impact on the daily life of men and women. For this reason, in order 
to assure the equal treatment of men and women, employment must be a priority in the 
reform agenda. Much has been done already. The changes can be observed easily in the 
recent surveys conducted by Eurostat.52 In 2006, the employment rate of women amounted 
to 57.3 %, an increase of 3.5 points from the 2000 level.53 If this trend continues, there will 
be a chance to meet the Lisbon criterion of 60 % by 2010.54  
The labour market is largely divided in respect to gender. In other words, it is easy to find 
typically feminized sectors such as public administration, education and health care. 
Moreover, women tend to occupy lower and medium level posts, whereas there are only 
few women hired on the highest managerial levels of employment in e.g. political and 
economic sectors.55 This situation may be a result of the inability to reconcile the 
                                                
49 Directive on Gender Equality, Preamble para. 1. 
50 Art. 14.1d. 
51 Art.  8. 
52 The increase of working women in the labour market is steady, although not rapid. The rate of 
employment of women in working age still lags behind that of men and from the economic 
perspective, the labour potential that could boost the European market is not fully used. At the same 
time, women are exposed to a higher risk of poverty and social exclusion, particularly in older age. 
For this reason, the elimination of the so-called employment gap is both an economic and social 
challenge for the EU (European Commission, 18). 
53 Eurostat. 
54 Commission Report on equality between women and men. COM (2007) 49 final, 6. 
55 Ibid, 6-7. 
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professional and private lives, and of an unequal division of home and family duties. It is 
important to recall that the employment rate of young and middle-aged women who have 
children dropped recently, whereas that of men increased. The steadily growing demand 
for flexible work force – i.e. personnel that is ready to work on changing shifts, on-call or 
to go on business trips - is unfavourable to women, since they are often obliged to fulfil 
also various tasks at home. In 2006, nearly 32,9 % of women worked part-time, while this 
figure for men amounted to 7,7 %, only.56  
The following sub-chapters of this article will tackle, on the basis of ECJ case law, gender 
equality issues such as: 1) equal access to employment with an analysis of acceptable 
exceptions and an evaluation of the admissible scope of the positive action measures (sub-
chapter 3.2), 2) equal pay and exceptions to this principle  (sub-chapter 3.3) and 3) 
promotions and dismissals (sub-chapter 3.4).  
3.1 The Scope of Gender Equality Law 
Egalitarianism is a part of EU’s social policy. So-called “negative harmonisation” has been 
used in social policy in completing the EU common market. This kind of integration aims at 
enhancing the mobility of goods, labour, capital and services by abolishing unnecessary 
barriers within the single market. The “negative harmonization” measures may therefore 
be assumed to be minimalistic in their nature.57 Moreover, the “subsidiary principle” (Art. 5 
of TEC), allows for Community actions only in cases where the objective cannot be better 
attained at the national level by national authorities. For these reasons already, legislation 
and any other actions in favour of gender equality are constrained at the Community level.   
On the other hand, while the European gender equality law complements national 
legislations, it is also supportive of higher standards. For instance, Article 27 of the New 
Equal Treatment Directive allows Member States to introduce or maintain provisions, which 
are more favourable to the protection of the principle of equal treatment than those set in 
the directive in question. However, the directive also requires that Member States take all 
necessary measures to ensure compliance with the directive’s provisions.58 
In spite of the wide scope of gender equality law in the EU, it does not cover the areas 
where the women have been discriminated against the most, namely contract law, criminal 
law and family law.59 Moreover, although the directives protect women with regards to 
employment, they do not guarantee equal treatment in closely related fields, such as e.g. 
education. The principle of equal treatment will not be complete in labour law without 
adequate regulation in all of the above-mentioned fields.  
It must also be noted that the European legislator has included pregnancy related problems 
in gender equality law. Pregnancy applies obviously to women only, and for this reason it 
could have been out of the reach of the gender equality principle, which is a fundamental 
human right applicable to both sexes. 
 
                                                
56 Ibid. 
57 Ostner 2000, 27. 
58 Even when a directive is neither transposed nor sufficiently clear, a national court is obliged to 
interpret national law in the light of such directive  (ECJ, Von Colson and Kaman, Case 14/83). 
59 Hervey 2005, 310. 
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3.2 Equal Access to Employment 
The principle of equal access to employment was introduced to EU law already in 1976 in 
the Equal Treatment Directive.  The directive was amended in 2002, as explained above. It 
has been said that this directive pursues a substantive model of equality.60  
Nowadays, the preamble of the New Equal Treatment Directive states61 that ensuring equal 
access to employment and vocational training is fundamental to the application of the 
principle of equal treatment. However, some exceptions to equal treatment are permitted, 
providing that the principle of proportionality is respected, that the aim is legitimate and 
that the exceptions are justified by reasons of a particular nature, or that the context of 
the work is such that the work can be carried out by one sex only.62 
3.2.1 Access and Positive Action Measures 
As was mentioned above, the New Equal Treatment Directive follows its predecessors in 
that it allows Member States to adopt measures that provide for specific advantages to 
make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity. However, the 
scope of these actions is strictly constrained by the ECJ’s rulings.  
Since the very first cases based on the Equal Treatment Directive’s art. 2.4, the ECJ has 
recognised that positive action measures, “although discriminatory in appearance, are in 
fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the 
reality of social life”.63  
Nonetheless, later on, German and Swedish laws, very favourable to women, were declared 
incompatible with Community law in cases Kalanke and Abrahamsson.64 In the cases, the 
German and Swedish measures favoured the “tie-break” principle: where male and female 
applicants for a job were equally qualified, the female was to be appointed in preference 
to the male, in case fewer than half of the employees in the sector in question were 
female.65 Yet, the Court denied the application of this rule:  
“… national rules which guarantee women absolute and unconditional 
priority for appointment or promotion go beyond promoting equal 
opportunities (…)”.66 
Marschall case67 involved a situation where women were not granted unconditional and 
absolute priority: female candidates were to be employed only in case there were no 
particular reasons, specific to an equally qualified male candidate, that would have made 
him more suitable for a job. The Court ruled as follows: 
                                                
60 ECJ, Thibault, Case C-136/95. 
61 Preamble para. 19. 
62 See Johnston, Case C-222/84. The renewal of Ms Johnston’s work contract as an armed member of 
a police reserve force was denied because of changes in the policy of the employer regarding the 
participation of female officers in such service.  
63 ECJ, Commission v. France, Case C-312/86. 
64 ECJ, Abrahamsson, Case C-407/98. The Court was called to judge on a Swedish scheme aimed at 
promoting university positions for female candidates over male candidates. The ECJ rejected the 
scheme, inter alia because the preferential treatment of female candidates was not based on “clear 
and unambiguous criteria such as to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in the professional 
career of members of the under-represented sex”. 
65 Ellis 1998, 404. 
66 ECJ, Kalanke, Case C-450/93, par. 22. 
67 ECJ, Marschall, Case C-409/95.  
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“…a national rule in terms of which, subject to the application of the saving 
clause [that women are not to be given priority in promotion if reasons 
specific to an individual male candidate tilt the balance in his favour], 
female candidates for promotion who are [sic] as qualified as the male 
candidates are to be treated preferentially in sectors where they are under-
represented may fall within the scope of  Article 2(4) [of Equal Treatment 
Directive] if such a rule may counteract the prejudicial effects on female 
candidates of the attitudes and behaviour (…) and thus reduce actual 
instances of inequality which may exist in the real world”.68  
Clearly, the Court allowed to give priority to female workers where there was room for an 
individual assessment of every applicant. The Court followed this line in Badeck.69 National 
rules that prescribed minimum quota systems that gave preference to the selection of 
female candidates were admissible under the following conditions:  
“…the [Equal Treatment] Directive does not preclude a national rule which, 
in sectors of the public service where women are under-represented, gives 
priority, where male and female candidates have equal qualifications, to 
female candidates where that proves necessary for ensuring compliance with 
the objectives of the women's advancement plan, if no reasons of greater 
legal weight are opposed, provided that that rule guarantees that 
candidatures are the subject of an objective assessment which takes 
account of the specific personal situations of all candidates”.70 
In spite of its recent, more flexible approach, in this judgment the ECJ upheld the 
approach it had adopted in Kalanke: it excluded any possibility of positive action from the 
part of Member States that would have given automatic preference to women, even when 
highly justified.71  
In addition to access to employment, discrimination on grounds of gender must be 
prohibited regarding access to all types and levels of vocational guidance, training, and 
retraining, practical work experience included.  
3.2.2 Exceptions to Equal Access to Employment  
Article 14 of the New Equal Treatment Directive prohibits discrimination at all levels of 
employment in the public as well as the private sector. The prohibition of discrimination 
encompasses the conditions for access to employment, which includes the selection criteria 
and the recruitment conditions. Nevertheless, exceptions to this principle are allowed. In 
the Johnston72 case, the Court ruled that although the principle of equal treatment of men 
and women is not subject to any general reservations as regards measures taken on the 
grounds of the protection of public safety73, it is possible for a Member State, when taking 
into account public safety and its internal situation, to restrict the access of women to 
particular fields of employment. This is the case when, by reason of the context of the 
                                                
68 Ibid., par. 31. 
69 ECJ, Badeck and Others, Case C-158/97. Advancement plans relating to the conditions of access 
and promotion for women and their working conditions, with binding targets were adopted in 
Germany and challenged by Mr. Badeck. In each woman’s advancement plan, more than half of the 
posts in a sector in which women were under-represented were to be designated for women.    
70 Ibid., par. 38. 
71 Cf.  ECJ, Abrahamsson et al. v. Fogelqvist , Case C-407/98. 
72 ECJ, Johnston, Case 222/84. The justification was public security. 
73 As in the case of Arts 30, 39, 46, TEC. 
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activities, the sex of the employee constitutes a determining factor for that occupational 
activity. Nevertheless, it is a duty of the Member States to assess periodically whether, in 
the light of social developments, the derogation from the general scheme of the equal 
treatment law may still be maintained. The measures must always be in conformity with 
the principles of proportionality. 
In a subsequent case, Commission v Austria,74 the ECJ established that women cannot:  
“… be excluded from a certain type of employment solely on the ground that 
they ought to be given greater protection than men against risks which 
affect men and women in the same way and which are distinct from 
women’s specific need of protection (…) nor may women be excluded from a 
certain type of employment solely because they are on average smaller and 
less strong than average men, while men with similar physical features are 
accepted for that employment”.  
It is clear that in order to protect genuinely equal access to employment, the exceptions 
must be limited only to those, which are objectively and narrowly constructed. In other 
words, an exception may only be justified by reasons applicable to a particular situation 
and when it is appropriate and necessary for achieving a legitimate aim. The national 
governments have certain degree of discretion in adopting measures which they consider 
necessary for guaranteeing public security.75 For example, although women cannot 
generally be excluded from military service, they can be prevented from performing 
specific activities in the armed forces of a Member State.76 
3.2.3 Evaluation of the ECJ Stance 
One cannot underestimate the positive impact that the ECJ has had on the access of 
women to employment. Nevertheless, even though the ruling of the Kalanke case has been 
relaxed by subsequent cases, it clearly shows that the scope of positive actions, as already 
indicated in Chapter 3, is limited by the rigid approach of the Court. Undisputedly, women 
are not in an equal position with men. Women have worse access to employment because, 
e.g., they are socially obliged to perform duties not related to their jobs. Therefore, a 
woman trying to access employment should not be compared to a man. The attempt of the 
Court to compare men and women as individuals is therefore not adequate. From this 
perspective, it seems that the best solution is to treat gender equality as a collective right 
that protects women as a disadvantaged group in the substantive equality meaning. This 
would give more leeway for Member States’ pro-female regulation, including more decisive 
positive action. The amended Art. 141 of TEC that permits positive action measures does 
not limit their scope. So if only the ECJ relaxed its case law, the Member States could start 
introducing measures such as quotas in employment. It is for the ECJ to adapt its reasoning 
to social needs and to fully follow the substantive model of equality. The Advocates-
General have already recognised in several opinions that otherwise equality between men 
and women in the procedure of selecting employees remains a fiction.77 
 
                                                
74 ECJ, Commission, C-203/03. 
75 See ECJ, Sirdar, Case C-273/97. 
76 See ECJ,  Kreil, Case C-285/98. 
77 See Opinion of Advocate General Saggio, 16 November, 1999, ECJ, Abrahamsson, Case C-407/98. 
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3.3 Equal Pay 
The Roadmap 2006-201078 indicates that there still is a pay gap between men and women. 
Female workers tend to earn 15 % less then their male colleagues and this gap is decreasing 
at a much slower pace than the gender employment gap. The principle of equal pay greatly 
influences the progress on the implementation of gender equality in employment. One of 
the means to facilitate the mentioned Lisbon criterion of women’s participation in labour is 
to ensure that employees of both genders receive the same pay. 
As mentioned above, a substantial part of the EU gender equality law owes its existence to 
the equal pay principle, originally included in the Treaty of Rome.79 The Court has 
reminded that: 
“…the economic aim of Article [141] of the Treaty, namely the elimination 
of distortions of competition between undertakings established in different 
member states, is secondary to the social aim pursued by the same 
provision, which constitutes the expression of a fundamental human right”.80 
3.3.1 Principle of Equal Pay 
For the first time the Court had to rule on this principle in 1978 in Defrenne. In this 
historical case, it acknowledged the direct effect of the ex. Art. 119 of the Treaty of Rome 
(now Art. 141 TEC) and opted for a wide interpretation of the concept of pay. The ECJ held 
that the insertion into the employment contract of an air hostess of a clause bringing the 
contract to an end when she reaches the age of 40 years, whereas there was no such 
limitation in the contracts of male cabin attendants who carried out the same work, 
constituted discrimination prohibited by the principle of equal pay for equal work. In the 
following case, the Court recognized that the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds 
of sex in the scope of equal pay covers both direct and indirect discrimination.81 Moreover, 
as is stated in Art. 141 TEC, work of equal value must be remunerated in the same way, 
whether it is performed by a man or a woman.82 The words used in Art. 141 TEC have the 
same meaning as Art. 1 of the former Equal Pay Directive,83 and now also the provisions of 
the New Equal Treatment Directive.  
The prohibition of discrimination between men and women applies to agreements of the 
public authorities, which are intended to regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to 
contracts between private individuals. Moreover, it is of no consequence to the principle 
whether the work is carried out in a private or public establishment or service.84 
• Definition of Pay 
Article 2.1e of the New Equal Treatment Directive repeats the wording of Art. 141 of TEC 
and provides that “pay” is: 
                                                
78 Communication (2006) 92, final, on A Roadmap for equality between women and men. 
79 Ellis 2000, 1403. 
80 ECJ, Deutsche Telecom, Case C-50/96. 
81 ECJ, Macarthys, Case 129/79. 
82 ECJ, Lawrence and Others, Case C-320/00. 
83 See ECJ, Barber,Case C-262/88. 
84 ECJ, Lawrence and Others, Case C-320/00. 
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“…the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other 
consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives directly 
or indirectly, in respect of his/her reemployment from his/her employer.” 
The concept of pay should be interpreted broadly in order to fully fulfil the purpose of the 
Art. 141 of TEC.85 It follows from case law of the Court86 that Art. 119 of the Treaty of 
Rome (now Art. 141 TEC) has direct effect.  
• Definition of Equal Work and Work of Equal Value 
The Court in Brunnhofer interpreted other elements of the principle of equal pay, that is 
“equal work” and “equal value”. The Court contested that terms “equal work” and “equal 
value” are entirely qualitative in character in that they would be exclusively concerned 
with the nature of the work actually performed. In order to ascertain that employees can 
be considered to be in a comparable situation it is vital to take account of a number of 
factors such as the nature of the work, the training requirements, and the working 
conditions. In other words, the sole ground that the work is classified in the same category 
under the collective agreement applicable to their employment is not sufficient.87 The ECJ 
has sometimes had difficulties in clearly defining these concepts, as e.g. the 
Angestelltenbetriebsrat88 case proves.  
3.3.2 Exceptions to the Equal Pay Principle 
It is well known that Art. 141 of TEC requires that men and women receive equal pay for 
equal work or for work of equal value. Until now, the Court has consistently held that there 
must be no discrimination over pay on the grounds of gender. Discrimination takes place 
when there is unequal pay and the causa is different gender.89 In other words, where a man 
and a woman perform equal work but do not receive equal pay, treatment would be lawful 
only if the employer is able to justify the inequality on grounds other than gender.90 The 
above introduced Bilka test for objective justification is satisfied, if the adopted pay 
system meets a real need of the employer, and if it is effective, necessary and appropriate 
with a view to achieving that need.  
• Qualifications 
First condition that justifies the inequality of work that in fact consists of the same duties 
was recognized in the case Angestelltenbetriebsrat and concerns qualifications. The Court 
was asked whether the different qualifications of the professions concerned meant that 
                                                
85 Within this concept fall for instance compensations; paid to a worker on termination of the 
employment relationship (ECJ, Kowalska, Case C-33/89); in the form of paid leave or overtime pay for 
attendance of training courses providing the knowledge necessary for working on staff councils (ECJ, 
Bötel, Case C-360/90); for unfair dismissal (ECJ, Seymour-Smith, Case C-167/97); benefits to women 
on maternity leave (ECJ, Gillespie, Case C-342/93); supplements (ECJ, Brunnhofer, Case C-381/99); 
retirement benefits (ECJ, Worringham and Humphreys, Case 69/80); pay during the sick leave (ECJ, 
Rinner-Kühn, Case 171/88); and even some benefits paid to a worker in connection with his 
redundancy (ECJ, Barber, case C-262/88). 
86 ECJ, Defrenne II, Case 43/75. 
87 In the ECJ, Brunnhofer Case C-381/99 a female employee and a male comparator were classified in 
the same job category under a collective employment agreement. This proved not to be conclusive 
proof that they were performing the same work or work of equal value. 
88 ECJ, Angestelltenbetriebsrat, Case C-309/97. In this case, two professions: doctors and graduate 
psychologists – the latter are predominantly women - performed the same activity and nevertheless 
received a different pay. 
89 Ellis 2000, 1404. 
90 ECJ, Defrenne II, Case 43/75. 
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they were not engaged in equal work for the purposes of Art. 141 of TEC. The easiest 
answer for this question would have been that even if the work is of equal value, the 
reason for the different pay is not the sex of the employee.91 Nevertheless, the Court chose 
a different and quite awkward approach to this matter. It held that qualifications implicate 
a work performed; in other words the same occupation performed by people of different 
qualifications is in fact a different work. As follows, doctors and graduate psychologists 
cannot perform equal work but seemingly identical activities. This way, the ECJ blurred the 
definition of equal work or work of equal value. Nevertheless, this blurring of lines has not 
adversely affected subsequent gender equality cases. 
A year later, in Örebro,92 the Court nevertheless did not follow the logic of 
Angestelltenbetriebsrat. The Court in this case divided the global package of pay of two 
groups performing the same activity but having different professions and said that each of 
the elements of the salary must be compared. In other words, it said that the basic monthly 
salary of female workers should be compared with the basic monthly salary of male workers 
who perform the same activities. What is most important in this case, is that the ECJ went 
back to the old principle that equal pay is breached only if the inequality is related to 
discrimination on the grounds of sex. It did not find that different qualifications could 
justify the difference in pay; it seemed that it paid attention only to the different working 
hours, which could not justify inequality.  
• Mobility, seniority, training and length of service 
Secondly, the Court had in Danfoss93 answered the question whether the differentiation in 
pay of supplements on the grounds of mobility, seniority and training constitutes objective 
criteria that preclude discrimination on the grounds of gender. The Court said that each of 
these criteria must be considered separately. The criterion of mobility is wholly neutral 
from the point of view of gender. However, the employer cannot justify applying the 
criterion of mobility, where its application proves to work systematically to the 
disadvantage of women. Nevertheless, as ruled already in Bilka, if the employer is able to 
prove that remuneration is justified by the reason of adaptability, which is of special 
importance for the performance of specific tasks, then mobility falls within the objective 
criteria. The Court adopted the same line of reasoning for the training criterion. However, 
in the case of length of service, it stated that: 
“… since length of service goes hand in hand with experience [emphasis 
added] and since experience generally enables the employee to perform his 
duties better, the employer is free to reward it without having to establish 
                                                
91 Ellis 2000, 1404. 
92 ECJ, Örebro, Case C-236/98. The Swedish Equal Opportunity Ombudsman had brought a claim on 
behalf of two female midwives who had the same job as a clinical technician, but received a smaller 
pay than he did. The main problem in this case was that the midwives received a lower basic monthly 
salary. However, because of their shift system of work, they were granted the inconvenient-hour 
supplement that comparators did not receive and worked slightly shorter weeks. If everything was 
taken into account, the remuneration of midwives would be the same as that of a clinical technician. 
93 ECJ, Danfoss, Case 109/88. A Danish national collective agreement for staff workers established a 
basic rate for different grades of workers, but permitted individual increments on the basis of 
flexibility, vocational training and seniority. Flexibility was assessed on the basis of quality of work, 
volume of work and the employee’s sense of initiative. However, employees had no knowledge of how 
these criteria were applied to them and so could not compare how their pay was made up. Male 
employees received on average 6.85 % higher pay than female employees. The system of individual 
wage increases meant that a woman could not prove sex discrimination as she could not identify the 
reasons for any differences in pay. 
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the importance it has for the performance of specific tasks entrusted to the 
employee”. 
Clearly, employers can justify the differentiation in pay or supplements with the criterion 
of experience, even though it would systematically work to the disadvantage of women. It 
also seemed that the Court in this case associated experience with the length of work. It 
appears that men have more opportunities to gather experience than women, not only 
because of easier access to work, but also because of the pregnancy leaves and the fact 
that fewer men than women take a parental leave. This stance of the ECJ is hard to 
defend, and is likely to constrain the development of gender equality in Europe. 
On the other hand, in Hill and Stapleton,94 the Court appeared to apply the Bilka test with 
regard to the length of service. In this case the main question was whether there was 
discrimination when workers who converted from job-sharing to full-time work regressed on 
the incremental salary scale, because the employer only calculated service by the length of 
time actually worked in a post. The Court admitted that job-sharers acquire the same 
experience as full-time employees and that the only difference between a job-sharer and a 
colleague working full-time lies in the period actually worked while job-sharing. Clearly, in 
this case, the ECJ disconnected experience from the length of service. It stated that 
employers that calculated service by the actual length of time worked in a post had to 
justify it by objective criteria unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex. Moreover, 
the Court recognized that 
“…Community policy in this area is to encourage and, if possible, adapt 
working conditions to family responsibilities. Protection of women within 
family life and in the course of their professional activities is, in the same 
way as for men, a principle which is widely regarded in the legal systems of 
the Member States as being the natural corollary of the equality between 
men and women, and which is recognised by Community law.” 
Most recently Ms Cadman, a full-time employee, faced a problem similar to that explained 
above concerning the reward for the length of service.95 The Court did not follow the 
opinion of Advocate-General Maduro, who followed Hill and Stapleton, but reverted to its 
previous judgment in Danfoss, instead. The Court said that the employer is free to reward 
length of service without having to establish the importance the length has for the 
performance of specific tasks entrusted to the employee. Further in the judgment, it did, 
however, not preclude that the employer must provide detailed justification of the 
criterion of length of service. This would be the case where the worker provides evidence 
that raises serious doubts as to whether recourse to the criterion of length of service is 
appropriate to attain the employer’s objective. Moreover, in the words of the ECJ “It is in 
such circumstances for the employer to prove that that [sic!] which is true as a general 
rule, namely that length of service goes hand in hand with experience and that experience 
enables the worker to perform his duties better”, applies in the case of the employer in 
                                                
94 ECJ, Hill and Stapleton, Case C-243/95. The case concerned two civil servants shared equally one 
full-time job, such that the benefits were shared equally by both persons concerned and the costs of 
the post to the administration remained the same.  
95 ECJ, Cadman, Case C-17/05. In this case, four of the claimant’s male colleagues, even though they 
worked in the same band 2 as inspectors, received a substantially higher pay than she did. Since 
women in band 2 had in average shorter service than men, the use of length of service as a 
determinant of pay had a disproportionate impact on them. Moreover, in this case it was admitted 
that throughout the European Union the length of service of female workers, taken as a whole, is 
shorter than that of male workers. 
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question. The employee on the other hand had the burden of providing evidence that was 
capable of raising serious doubts on the appropriateness of the criterion. This case 
undoubtedly constitutes a step backwards in the ECJ’s case law on the matter. It also 
seems to be contrary to the New Equal Treatment Directive, which imposes the burden of 
proof on the employer.96  
• Maternity leave 
Thirdly, the line of reasoning of the Court in the case Gillespie,97 which concerned pay 
during maternity leave, is also unsatisfactory. The ECJ held that there was no breach of the 
equal pay principle where women received lower than normal pay during maternity leave 
according to national legislation on maternity leave. They were in a special position, which 
required them to be afforded special protection, but which was not comparable with that 
of men, or with that of women actually at work. For this reason, it would be sufficient for 
their maternity pay to be “adequate”. This justification shows that the Court took a 
completely different approach on equal pay than that on similar cases concerning equal-
treatment. If the ECJ followed the line of Dekker, Aldi or Webb v EMO (Air Cargo) cases98 
and established direct discrimination, the women in question would be able to successfully 
claim equal pay treatment. The reason behind the different approaches is not clear. 
Currently, this matter is dealt with in Art. 2.2c of the New Equal Treatment Directive, 
which explicitly says that discrimination on the grounds of gender is 
“… any less favourable treatment of a woman related to pregnancy or 
maternity leave within the meaning of Pregnancy Directive.” 
3.3.3 Evaluation of the ECJ Stance 
As these cases indicate, the approach of the Court towards the principle of equal pay is not 
as satisfactory as could be expected. The oldest, and most widely established and 
recognised of the equality principles does not receive sufficient support from the ECJ. 
Although it was the Court of Justice itself that developed and strengthened the idea of 
equal pay, the analysed cases clearly show that this principle needs further strengthening 
and clarification.  
The Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men issued an opinion on 
gender pay gap on 22 March 2007.99 In this opinion, the Committee enumerated many 
factors, which if taken into account in legislation or in “soft” measures, could have an 
impact on or substantially reduce the pay gap. Obviously, the principle of equal pay is 
infringed by factors that are directly connected to the pay, such as wage structure and the 
composition of pay, or differences between part-time and full-time jobs. To eliminate this 
problem entirely, however, changes would have to go beyond the labour sector, and apply 
to e.g. education, training and family life.  
The equal pay principle will not develop without a proper involvement of the ECJ. It is 
therefore essential that the Court change its line of reasoning in these cases. As explained 
above, in the recent Cadman case100 the Court failed to provide sufficient protection from 
                                                
96 Art. 19.1. 
97 A group of nurses complained of discrimination because their maternity leave pay was substantially 
lower than their “normal” remuneration. Moreover, they did not receive a pay increase granted to 
other workers when on maternity leave because of the different way of calculating their pay. 
98 ECJ, Dekker, Case C-177/88; ECJ, Aldi, Case 179/88; ECJ, Webb v. EMO (Air Cargo), Case C-32/93. 
99 Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities Between Women and Men 2007. 
100 ECJ, Cadman, Case C-17/05.  
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the arbitrary measures of an employer. Moreover, the Court burdened the employee with 
the duty to provide proof. If the Court had followed the logic from Hill and Stapleton or the 
Advocate General’s opinion, the principle of equal pay would have been protected. The 
necessary legal provisions already exist, both in the Treaty and in the relevant directives. 
There is no urgent need for further legislation in support of the equal pay principle. What is 
required is a more consistent and more supportive interpretation of the established 
concepts and principles by the Court. To be sure, any factors that can create obstacles or 
hinder the equal opportunities of women in employment should be allowed under strict 
conditions only, on the basis of proper and objective justifications.  
3.4 Promotions and Dismissals 
In addition to the above described access to work and equal pay situations, there is one 
further important area where female workers receive different treatment than their male 
colleagues: promotions and dismissals. The situation of pregnant employees is especially 
acute and difficult. The inability of pregnant women to perform some duties or their 
absence from work due to some pregnancy-related health complications usually impacts the 
ability to work and hence to receive benefits at work. Usually such situations are the main 
reasons for female workers’ dismissals. In spite of the fact that the Court has in many 
occasions explicitly prohibited discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy, it still takes 
place in practice. 
3.4.1 Promotions 
Thibault101 case concerned the right to promotions. The Court acknowledged the Member 
States’ right to rule on maternity leaves, but concluded that this cannot “serve as a basis 
for unfavourable treatment of a woman regarding her working conditions”. The Court 
advanced a hypothesis that if in the Thibault case, the concerned woman had not been 
pregnant and had not taken the maternity leave to which she was entitled, she would have 
been assessed, and could have qualified for a promotion. In other words, in this case the 
ECJ did not avoid the comparison of pregnant women to their working colleagues.  
Another case that related to the discrimination of pregnant women by the employer 
concerned the right to full pay during an absence at work that resulted from a pathological 
condition connected to pregnancy and that started before the maternity leave.102 Such a 
right was granted to employees on a “normal” sick leave, attested by a medical certificate. 
The Court maintained the line from Brown v Rentokil,103 which concerned a dismissal: 
“… the fact that a women is deprived, before the beginning of her maternity 
leave, of her full pay when her incapacity for work is the result of a 
pathological condition connected with the pregnancy must be regarded as 
treatment based essentially on the pregnancy and thus as discriminatory”. 
The Court acknowledged also that the infringement of gender equality law could take place 
when the employer refuses to provide references when asked by an employee. This 
                                                
101 Ms Thibault was denied the right of an annual assessment of her performance during the year 1983 
that would lead to promotion because of her prolonged absence at work that amounted to 7 months. 
According to French law, one of the conditions that allows for an assessment of performance is at 
least six months’ presence at work. It was clear that Ms Thibault would have satisfied all the 
conditions of French law, if she had not taken a maternity leave during this year. 
102 ECJ, Pedersen, Case C-66/96. 
103 ECJ, Brown, Case C-394/96. 
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situation in case Coote104 has particular importance, since the alleged discrimination took 
place after the employment relationship had ended due to a pregnancy-related dismissal.  
3.4.2 Dismissals 
The Court has in many cases stated that the term “dismissal” must be given a wide 
meaning.105  In the case Brown v Rentokil,106 the Court reasoned that pregnancy is a special 
condition, during which a woman is susceptible to complications and other disorders; 
therefore, pregnant workers would require special protection. The dismissal of a pregnant 
worker for a pregnancy-related illness must be regarded as based on pregnancy. Moreover, 
since this situation can only affect women, it constitutes automatically prohibited direct 
discrimination. The scope of this judgment is very broad, since it encompasses any kind of 
situation where a pregnant woman is treated detrimentally for a reason that may be 
associated with the pregnancy.107 In spite of this, as mentioned earlier in chapter 2.1.1, in 
Aldi the Court stated that dismissals resulting from an illness, which occurs after the 
delivery of a baby and the end of the maternity leave, even though related to pregnancy, 
are not forbidden. Moreover, in the following case Larsson, the Court held that the 
treatment received by a woman, dismissed for illness arising out of pregnancy but 
continuing after the end of maternity leave, could be compared with that received by a 
sick male colleague. The Court went on to say: 
“… male and female workers are equally exposed to illness. Although certain 
disorders are (…) specific to one of other sex, the only question is whether a 
woman is dismissed on account of absence due to illness in the same 
circumstances as a man; if that is the case, then there is no direct 
discrimination on grounds of sex…”108 
Nowadays, the conditions of dismissal of pregnant women are regulated in Art. 10 of the 
Pregnancy Directive. Generally, it prohibits the dismissal of workers that are pregnant or on 
maternity leave. In exceptional cases not connected to the condition of such workers, 
however, it allows for dismissals that are permitted under national legislation or practice, 
provided that the competent authority has given its consent. Moreover, the employer must 
cite duly substantiated grounds for such a dismissal in writing. Because a lot of case law 
was decided before the entry into force of the Pregnancy Directive and the New Equal 
Treatment Directive, the legislator had a chance to include some of principles of the 
Court’s decisions in the mentioned acts. Currently, Art. 8 of Pregnancy Directive invites 
Member States to take all necessary measures to provide for a continuous period of 
maternity leave of at least 14 weeks allocated before and/or after confinement. The New 
Equal Treatment Directive provides women on maternity leave with a right to return to 
their job or an equivalent post on terms and conditions no less favourable than those they 
would have been entitled to during their absence.109 Moreover, it explicitly says that less 
                                                
104 ECJ, Coote, Case C-185/97. 
105 See ECJ, Joan Roberts, Case 151/84. 
106 Ms Brown was dismissed because of her absence at work. Her employment contract included a 
provision that allowed her employer to terminate her contract in case of a continuous absence of 
more than 26 weeks. Because of a medical condition resulting from pregnancy, Ms Brown was absent 
from work and was automatically dismissed when her 26 weeks’ leave was up. The interesting issue in 
this case was that Ms Brown had been treated in exactly the same way as her male colleagues, if no 
specific consideration was give to the pregnancy. 
107 Ellis 1994, 14-18. 
108 ECJ, Larsson, Case C-400/95.  
109 Art. 15. 
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favourable treatment of pregnant women or women on maternity leave is within the 
meaning of discrimination.110  
In case Melgar111 the ECJ acknowledged the direct effect of the provisions of this directive 
and ruled that the provisions apply both to indefinite and fixed-term contracts. The Court 
said that Member States are not obliged to draw up a specific list of the reasons for 
dismissal, which exceptionally would be allowed in the case of pregnant workers.112 In 
another case decided on the basis of the Pregnancy Directive, the ECJ faced the question 
whether the dismissal of a pregnant woman can be justified by the reason that she was 
hired for a fixed period, and that she failed to inform the employer that she was pregnant 
even though she was aware of this when the contract of employment was concluded and 
she was unable to work during a substantial part of the term of that contract because of 
her pregnancy.113 The Court answered all these questions in the negative, but did not 
reject the rationale of the justification as such. 
3.4.3 Evaluation of the ECJ Stance 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 on direct discrimination, in cases of pregnancy, the ECJ seems 
to acknowledge the possibility of certain objective justifications. This weakens the 
protection of pregnant women against dismissals and other detrimental treatment.  
The limited scope of protection for women, who have pregnancy-related complications 
after their maternity leave, is unsatisfactory. Such women are deprived of protection and 
exposed to unfavourable measures.  
The judgments of the ECJ in cases that concern pregnant women are especially inconsistent 
and difficult to follow. On many occasions the Court clearly stated that comparison of 
pregnant workers to male workers is not allowed. Yet, there are judgements where in fact 
such comparison is applied. Again, if the Court followed a substantive model of equality, a 
comparison between men and women would no longer be necessary. 
                                                
110 Art. 2.2c. 
111 ECJ, Melgar, Case C-438/99. 
112 Also who recently gave birth or are breastfeeding. 
113 See ECJ, TeleDanmark, Case C-109/00. 
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4 SUMMARY WITH EVALUATION 
The principle of gender equality has successfully become a part of the top agenda of the 
European Union. Unfortunately, the developments have not reached a happy-ending yet. To 
the contrary, it seems that the firm promotion of women has recently weakened. There 
still are not enough incentives nor favourable interpretations to complement a formal 
equality approach. The situation has clearly not followed the rapid and buoyant 
developments of anti-discrimination law in race, religion, and other sectors.  
Discrimination of women may take place in all parts of life. For this reason, European law 
on gender equality cannot be restricted to the labour market, only. The legislator must 
make the most out of the potential of Article 13 TEC, and broaden the scope of gender 
equality law to fields such as media, education and taxation. The most recent tool – gender 
mainstreaming – has considerably improved the situation in the mentioned fields.  
While EU law promotes gender equality in many ways, there are also certain limitations, 
mainly as a consequence of the principles of “conferred powers”, “subsidiarity” and 
“proportionality”. Yet, what this paper has set out to establish is to discuss the limitations 
that derive from the inconsistent, rigid and constrained case law of the ECJ. 
4.1 Positive action 
Initially, the zeal for positive action measures was diluted by the reluctant approach of the 
ECJ in cases such as Kalanke. In the Badeck case, it looked for a moment as if the ECJ was 
ready to take a stance that is more flexible and more supportive of gender equality. Alas, 
this approach has not been confirmed in e.g. Abrahamsson, where the ECJ upheld its view 
of gender equality as an individualist right. To be sure, Member States are in general not 
ready for a novel and more demanding concept of collective rights. But clinging firmly on to 
the old and inadequate theories will hinder the necessary developments. The ECJ has to 
calculate the pros and cons of adopting new attitudes. At stake is the economy of the EU, 
which in times of an ageing population and reluctance to further enlargements will 
eventually decline due to an insufficient labour force. Moderate positive action measures 
could prevent this type of a dark scenario. The ECJ should finally stop trying to compare 
the incomparable, and promote a greater participation of women in the labour market. 
Women should have preferred access to employment in justified circumstances.   
4.2 Equal Pay 
As regards some concepts of gender equality, the judgments of the ECJ have been 
inconsistent. The first problem relates to the equal pay principle, the second to pregnancy 
related absences, benefits granted and dismissals at work. 
The equal pay principle—the bedrock of gender equalit—has not protected women against 
indirect discrimination in recent cases. The Cadman case is an example of the 
unpredictability of the ECJ’s decisions. The ECJ failed to apply the equal pay principle 
against employers who tried to evade it through experience-related criteria. Experience 
and other criteria like mobility and flexibility are factors that improve the value of an 
employee, and are therefore of unquestionable importance. It is nonetheless strange that 
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they may be used as grounds to alter the scope of pay without proving any objectively 
justified reasons. The reasoning of Hill and Stapleton, although it applied to a job-sharer, 
could be applied to full-time workers. Another issue is the calculation of pay during 
maternity leave. The protection of pregnant women as regards the working conditions is 
well established, as is their protection from discrimination. Yet this did not prevent the 
Court from allowing lower pays during maternity leaves in Gillespie. 
4.3 Promotions and dismissals 
With regard to promotions and dismissals, major inconsistencies can be observed in the 
protection of women who are absent from work due to pregnancy-related health problems. 
Although protection is granted to female workers during their pregnancy and maternity 
leave, in Aldi the Court refused to provide the same protection for women beyond the time 
of their leave. This means that only women with unproblematic pregnancies are fully 
protected, whilst those who suffer from medical complications—in other words those who 
need the protection the most—may be deprived of safeguards.  
As the deficiencies in positive actions, equal pay and working conditions such as promotions 
and dismissals clearly show, gender equality needs to be further promoted. In fact, the 
rejected European Constitution was intended to make some progress. It not only retained 
all the existing provisions on equality between women and men, but provided also for a 
number of improvements. In Article 1a of the Lisbon Treaty equality is mentioned among 
the Union’s values and as one of the characteristics of the European societal model. The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights114 will eventually become legally binding. By abolishing the 
EU’s pillar structure, gender mainstreaming will also cover the field of Foreign and Security 
Policy, as well as Justice and Home Affairs.  
However, the most immediate hope for improvement rests with the New Equal Treatment 
Directive. This instrument will combine the most important gender equality acts, and will 
improve the transparency and clarity—and thereby the implementation—of the principle of 
equality between genders in the Member States. Next, similar legislation for the fields 
beyond the labour market is called for. 
                                                
114 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000. 
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Table 1. Important cases in favor of gender equality. 
Name of a case Number of a case Description 
Defrenne  Case 80/70, [1976],  
ECR 00445 
The ECJ admitted a direct effect of the Art. 119 
and that she suffered as a female worker 
discrimination (considerably lower retirement 
age) in terms of pay as compared with male 
colleagues who were doing the same work as 
“cabin steward” 
Bilka  Case C-170/84, 
[1986],  
ECR I-7637 
The Court stated that the policy to grant only full-
time workers an occupational pension is contrary 
to Art. 119 of the Treaty of Rome. A much lower 
proportion of women than of men work full-time 
and the measure cannot be explained by factors 
that would exclude discrimination on the grounds 
of sex. The ECJ recognised indirectly 
discriminatory measures. 
Marschall Case C-409/95 The ECJ created a way for positive action 
measures of Member States, which resulted in the 
affirmation in the Amsterdam Treaty115 (Arts 3.2 
and 141.4 hereinafter referred to as TEC) of the 
Member States’ right to adopt positive action 
measures 
Badeck Case C-158/97 The Court allowed for giving priority to female 
workers where there was room for an individual 
assessment of every applicant 
Hill and 
Stapleton 
Case C-243/95 The Court admitted that job-sharers acquire the 
same experience as full-time employees and that 
the only difference between a job-sharer and a 
colleague working full-time lies in the period 
actually worked while job-sharing. Clearly, in this 
case, the ECJ disconnected experience from the 
length of service. It stated that employers that 
calculated service by the actual length of time 
worked in a post had to justify it by objective 
criteria unrelated to any discrimination on 
grounds of sex. 
Brown v. 
Rentokil 
 Ms Brown, was dismissed because of her absence 
at work. Because of a medical condition resulting 
from pregnancy, Ms Brown was absent from work 
and as a result automatically dismissed when her 
26 weeks’ leave was up. The interesting issue in 
this case was that Ms Brown had been treated in 
exactly the same way as her male colleagues if no 
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special importance was attached to pregnancy.  
The Court reasoned that pregnancy is a special 
condition, during which a woman is susceptible to 
complications and other disorders; therefore, 
pregnant workers would require special 
protection. The dismissal of a pregnant worker for 
a pregnancy-related illness must be regarded as 
based on pregnancy. 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Important cases that hinder the development of gender equality. 
Name of a case Number of a case Description 
Kalanke Case 450/93  Excluded any possibility of positive action from 
the part of Member States that would have given 
automatic preference to women, even when 
highly justified 
Danfoss Case 109/88 In the case of length of service the Court stated 
that the employer is free to reward it without 
having to establish the importance it has for the 
performance of specific tasks entrusted to the 
employee. 
Cadman Case C-17/05 The Court said that the employer is free to reward 
length of service without having to establish the 
importance the length has for the performance of 
specific tasks entrusted to the employee. 
Gillespie Case C-342/93 The ECJ held that there was no breach of the 
equal pay principle where women received lower 
than normal pay during maternity leave according 
to national legislation on maternity leave. They 
were in a special position, which required them to 
be afforded special protection, but which was not 
comparable with that of men, or with that of 
women actually at work. For this reason, it would 
be sufficient for their maternity pay to be 
“adequate”. 
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Thibault Case C-136/95 The Court acknowledged the Member States’ right 
to rule on maternity leaves, but concluded that 
this cannot “serve as a basis for unfavourable 
treatment of a woman regarding her working 
conditions”. The Court advanced a hypothesis that 
if in the Thibault case, the concerned woman had 
not been pregnant and had not taken the 
maternity leave to which she was entitled, she 
would have been assessed, and could have 
qualified for a promotion. In other words, in this 
case the ECJ did not avoid the comparison of 
pregnant women to their working colleagues. 
Aldi Case 179/88 The Court stated that dismissals resulting from an 
illness, which occurs after the delivery of a baby 
and the end of the maternity leave, even though 
related to pregnancy, are not forbidden. 
Larsson Case C-400/95 The Court held that the treatment received by a 
woman, dismissed for illness arising out of 
pregnancy but continuing after the end of 
maternity leave, could be compared with that 
received by a sick male colleague. 
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